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As evidenced by an increasing number of publi-
cations on the topic, during the last decade social 
researchers in Ukraine and abroad, as well as jour-
nalists and political analysts, have tended to pay 
a great deal of attention to the phenomenon of so 
called ‘oligarchs’, or ‘business groups’. Some au-
thors argue that one of the defining characteristics of 
the post-Socialist state is the mutual affiliation of 
political elites with big enterprises and vice versa 
(they describe ‘clans’ and so called ‘oligarchs’), 
which enables key political-business actors to use 
political capital and positional power to secure re-
sources for their businesses and increase their prof-
its [1]. Though these studies emphasize the impor-
tance of informality in elite functioning and deci-
sion-making processes, they do not paint an overall 
picture of the relational structures that exist between 
power agents. Other authors trace connections be-
tween economic and political elites by analyzing the 
levels of funding of political parties originating 
from ‘business groups’, thus showing a kind of hid-
den governance of the state through informal link-
ages between business and political actors [5]. Such 
studies apply approaches to exploring power inter-
locks between interest groups developed in the US 
where contributions to election campaigns from dif-
ferent companies and directorates are commonly 
traced [13]. 
However, the extent to which these financial 
contributions make business actors really important 
agents in decision-making remains an open ques-
tion, especially taking into account the official posi-
tions in power structures of key ‘businessmen-poli-
ticians’ – as heads or deputy heads in parliamentary 
committees, for instance. Identification of overlap-
ping biographical experience may assist in the anal-
ysis of formal and informal connections between 
political elite members affiliated with business ac-
tivities, and result in a map of the network of such 
overlapping connections between political elite 
members, thus helping to define key actors within 
this network. 
Embeddedness of economic elites  
in governing structures
The role of informal connections between busi-
nesses of large or medium size and state authorities, 
as well as different favourable outcomes of such co-
hesion was widely explored and described in studies 
referring to the phenomenon of the ‘Komsomol 
economy’ in the late USSR and afterwards, during 
‘privatization’ [3; 14; 19; 9; etc.]. Recent research 
on Ukrainian banks and their affiliation with politi-
cal authorities has shown that the efficiency of 
banks` business activity to a large extent depends on 
interaction with governing and legislative authori-
ties on national and regional levels [6].
Within this paper, the concept of elites refers to 
the overlapping higher circles of people connected 
together through their affiliation with several power 
institutions, i.e. occupying strategic positions in 
large corporations, civic organizations, and govern-
ing authorities being able to influence state decision-
making regularly [12]. Consequently, big compa-
nies or even groups of companies should aim to 
have influence on political authorities through lob-
bies in government or parliament. In order to under-
stand the functionality of this influence, the re-
searcher is prompted to investigate ‘elite net-
works’ 1 – a key concept within this research. Mills 
emphasized that an increasing number of overlaps 
between economic, military and political structures 
leads to reciprocity which may be observed as state 
1 Concepts of ‘power interlocks’, or ‘interlocking directorates’, 
became actively explored after Mills` work titled “Power Elite”[12] 
which in particular distinguished so called ‘higher cycles’ – elite 
members interconnected through membership in common political, 
economic and military authorities.
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infl uence on business and enterprises, and vice versa 
where private sector actors have impact on state 
decision-making processes. 
American researchers William Domhoff [8] and 
later Michael Patrick Allen [4], argued that ‘inter-
locks of directors’ result when top-managers (non-
owners) are invited to sit on corporate boards not 
only because of their professionalism but also due to 
their interpersonal connections with each other – 
a common practice among successful companies 
nowadays. Domhoff also remarked that interlocks 
are extremely important for fostering information 
flows within a corporate network, and in addition, 
these interlocking actors are often invited to ses-
sions of state committees. This approach continues 
previous research on ‘interlocking directorates’, i.e. 
between corporations, banks, and state institutions 
[4; 16]. 
Resources and networks
One of the reasons individuals seek to enter 
elite groups is that they provide opportunities to 
access exclusive and/or substantial resources of 
various types. As Olga Kryshtanovskaya argued 
[3], those who are in the center of the state organi-
zational hierarchy accumulate and personify politi-
cal capital. On the one hand, the fact of one’s mem-
bership in the political elite enables the use of re-
sources that are concentrated in a particular 
position, and on the other hand, different forms of 
capital are exchanged during the process of one’s 
vertical or horizontal mobility. Kryshtanovskaya 
describes the political space as a market where in-
dividuals trade and make deals. Consequently, the 
more transactions and contracts one is involved in, 
the wider network he or she has, and the more ob-
ligations he or she has exchanged with other ac-
tors. Here, two components are emphasized – 
transactions, or relations, and obligations closely 
connected with trust. 
Several authors have suggested that continuous 
interaction and resource exchange in general, and 
social capital accumulation in particular, provide 
a basis for the development of social network anal-
ysis (SNA) as a unique research approach. Thus, 
Lin and Burt argued that network interaction re-
sults in the formation of stable structures; effective 
capitalization of resources, their accumulation and 
multiplication results in social group cohesion – 
especially in states undergoing transformation or 
during rapid social changes [11: 3–25]. Lin empha-
sized that social capital accumulated through the 
operation of network ties actually stimulates the 
circulation of other kinds of resources during inte-
raction. 
Trust as a crucial component of social capital is 
one of the factors that assist in building informal 
networks. Actually, this component exists due to 
social embeddedness and continuous interaction, 
adding density to the network and stability to its 
structure. Sztompka mentioned two types of trust 
– personal and institutional [15]. Under the cir-
cumstances of transition, when changes in social 
structures are rapid, the importance of interperson-
al trust for transacting parties increases because 
actors are limited in their ability to appeal to com-
mon cultural or social patterns (norms) shared by 
all. At the same time, interpersonal trust can serve 
as a basis for the building and functioning of social 
networks when institutional trust is low and social 
norms unstable. Thus, members of a business elite 
who are connected with each other through ties 
grounded on interpersonal trust can feel safer in a 
‘partnership’ network where even a small piece of 
information about one`s unreliability or trickery 
might exclude the actor from the network – a form 
of punishment that precludes further communica-
tion or transactions with network members. When 
interpersonal trust is present in relations between 
business and state authorities, the economic activ-
ity of enterprises controlled by network members 
is safer and more stable. 
Consequently, social capital as a network-based 
resource is also important in establishing the ‘rules 
of the game’ – norms of interaction acceptable for 
the majority of actors within the network. During 
a period of transition when old norms are eliminated 
(discredited) but new ones are still to be formulated, 
actors need to reach consensus regarding the inter-
pretation of norms. Interpersonal trust then becomes 
the basic condition for effective interaction – at least 
until formal and informal rules become institution-
alized.
In summary: when political and business elite 
networks overlap, trust develops, as economic 
agents gain influence on state decision-making, 
while political agents profit from business. One of 
the ways to explore the overlapping of business and 
political elites is to apply the concept of ‘interlock-
ing directorates’ and to investigate the network ties 
of members of the political elite with big business. 
Specifically, we analyze recent business affiliations 
of Ukraine’s Parliamentary deputies – a link that is 
especially important due to the frequency of elec-
tions in Ukraine, and the fact that these campaigns 
are presented in the mass media as ‘struggles for re-
sources’.
Methodology
Publications on power networks and interlock-
ing directorates are focused on different topics – 
from mapping the interlocks to forecasting how net-
work members may behave in the future. In this 
paper, the possible network connections within 
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Ukraine’s political elite are analyzed using social 
network analysis, specifically the concept of affilia-
tion networks [17:291–307] widely applied in the 
research of political and policy networks [10]. As 
Wellman argues, the networks perspective broadens 
analyses of inter-individual connections by focusing 
on interpersonal ties that do not form strict groups, 
but rather are flexible and not limited to exact groups 
[18:19-49]. 
Within this paper, the SNA approach was applied 
to trace the overlapping of economic connections 
between the political elite members with other types 
of ties between them 1. The main tasks were:
a) to map linkages between members of the politi-
cal elite 
b) to analyze the overlaps between different types 
of ties,
c) to identify key players in the subset of actors 
connected with common business affiliations in 
the past.
Analysis of elite member biographies was con-
ducted first to identify possible ties between the ac-
tors based on common biographical experiences. 
The initial data allowed for a depiction of five types 
of ties – political, economic, civic, educational, and 
kinship. For purposes of this paper the subset of 
those elite members who appeared to have common 
experience of owning or managing businesses in the 
past were extracted from a larger dataset. Thus, the 
final sample included 79 actors and five types of ties 
between them, with the analysis focusing on over-
laps between business connections and other types 
of linkages. 
Empirical Results
Analysis of official biographies of political elite 
members showed that business ties appeared to be 
not as numerous as expected in the beginning of the 
research project – a fact that may derive from a 
widely held assumption that some deputies prefer 
not to mention their business affiliations in their of-
ficial published biographies. 
In order to specifically investigate the role of 
business network ties in Ukraine’s political sphere 
the group of 79 actors with common business ac-
tivity in their pasts was extracted. Chart 1 displays 
business ties only 2. Thus the number of actors is 
smaller in order to show only those political elite 
1 The complete data includes 493 biographies of political elite 
members (including MPs, Ministers of the Cabinet of Ministers, and 
high-level functionaries within the Presidential Administration). The 
biographical data was collected from the web-pages of state institu-
tions, from periodicals, handbooks such as “Who is who in Ukraine”, 
and from the press interviews with them. Besides, 15 in-depth inter-
views were conducted during last two years to verify the connec-
tions based on common biographical experiences of elite members. 
For more details on sample description and SNA method applica-
tion, please, see [2].
2 UCINET software package with application NetDraw was 
used for running network statistics and network visualization [7].
members whose biographies provided informa- 
tion about overlapping periods of being employed 
as a top-manager or director by the same enter-
prise, or being shareholders of the same company. 
Mapped ties show affiliations with the same enter-
prise. 
In the next stage of analysis, the political ties 
(i.e. common membership in Parliamentary com-
mittees of the previous terms, overlapping periods 
of work in the state and/or local authorities of the 
legislative and/or governmental branches, the role 
of a local representative of the presidential candi-
date, etc.) of those politicians with common busi-
ness biographies were analyzed. Specifically, this 
meant identifying previous common work in a state 
or local administrative organ in addition to common 
business ownership and/or firm management. The 
results are shown in Chart 2 below.
When comparing the structure of connections on 
these two charts, one can notice that ‘business’ and 
‘political’ ties generally do not overlap. This finding 
may be explained by a possible strategy of politi-
cians: two (or more) political elite members who 
have common business affiliations may wish to ex-
pand their network further, to establish connections 
with colleagues in Parliament, to diversify opportu-
nities to influence legislation and state decision-
making through different committees and commis-
sions.
Finally, the analysis of the most ‘leading’ actors 
within this group of businessmen-politicians was 
complied running the procedure of centrality mea-
sures analysis 3. In order to define actors with the 
highest possible level of influence, centrality mea-
sures should be calculated for each node, i.e., degree 
and betweenness centrality measures which show 
the level of actor`s influence in different ways de-
pending on: a) an actor`s own connectedness, num-
ber of direct ties with alters, and b) one`s position as 
a ‘gate-keeper’ between different dense subgroups 
of actors [17]. Thus, actors can be perceived as in-
fluential and powerful through being well-connect-
ed directly or indirectly with others. 
As it is stated by Wasserman and Faust, the mea-
sure of degree centrality “is focused on the most vis-
ible actors in the network”, and key persons thus 
can be defined as those who occupy a central net-
work location, thus appearing to act as a “major 
channel of relational information” (17:178-180). 
These actors can be perceived as influential and 
powerful due to their roles in making the network 
more dense and cohesive. 
Table in Appendix 1 allows for a comparison of 
actors according to their degree centrality scores, 
showing indicator values in each of five types of 
3 In general, a network measure that determines the relative 
importance of an actor within the network based on the relational 
pattern of each actor with regard to the rest of the network [17].
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networks. The analysis of degree centrality values 
shows some pattern of clustering inside the analyzed 
subset of the political elite network, and suggests 
a possible typology of political elite members refer-
ring to their connections. Accordingly, the follow-
ing subgroups of actors can be identified among 
those who were affiliated with a common business 
enterprise in the past:
Chart 1. Business ties between actors affiliated with the same company in the past
Chart 2. State/political ties between actors with common business biographies
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a) the first subgroup includes those whose degree 
centrality scores are much higher than the mean 
for business ties, but their scores for other pos-
sible connections (i.e. of other types) are low. 
This situation can be explained as having been a 
result of the relatively short experiences of such 
actors as members of state authorities in general 
and Parliament in particular (i.e. Akhmetov, 
Vilkul, Prasolov, Hlushchenko, Hlazunov, etc.) 
b) the second subgroup includes those whose de-
gree centrality is high as a result of their political 
ties being higher than average. In some cases 
this large number of political connections is due 
to their having been members of Parliament dur-
ing several previous terms, working in different 
committees during different terms (i.e. Baburin, 
BuriakOV, Vasadze, Bilorus, Dovhyi, Demianko, 
Zviahilskyi, Zhevaho, Labunska, Lukianov, Osy-
ka, Tretiakov, etc.). These actors generally have 
only 1–2 ‘business’ connections (i.e. previous 
employment in the same enterprise), which is a 
low number compared to actors from the previ-
ous group, but this cannot be taken as evidence 
of their low business activity – official biogra-
phies and other official information sources may 
omit this kind of data. This will be the subject of 
further verification during future interview re-
search;
c) the third subgroup of analyzed actors has 
high degree centrality scores not only for 
political ties but also for civic, meaning that 
these political elite members head philanthrop-
ic, party, sport, or scientific-research organiza-
tions. This subgroup is somewhat similar with 
the previous one in that high scores for degree 
centrality of their political ties are a result of 
their having been members of multiple previ-
ous Parliaments (i.e.Yankovskyi, Sobolev, Sku-
dar, Stetskiv, KliuevАP, Kolesnikov, Hudyma, 
Bohdan, etc.)
Further analysis of the 79 actors` positions in 
Parliamentary committees yielded additional find-
ings. There are five committees that play a major 
role in the economic development of the state: the 
Economic Policy Committee, the Budget Commit-
tee, the Industrial and Regulatory Policy and Entre-
preneurship Committee, the Finance and Banking 
Committee, the Committee on Taxation and Cus-
toms Policy. Three more committees provide legis-
lative initiatives important for economic develop-
ment on a national and international level: the Com-
mittee on Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy 
and Nuclear Safety, the Agrarian Policy and Land 
Relations Committee, and the Transport and Com-
munications Committee. These eight committees 
(from a total of 27) construct and support the legis-
lative framework of the Ukrainian economy, both 
on national and international levels. 
The distribution of the analyzed network 
members (consisting of 79 political elite actors) 
across Parliamentary committees during 2007–
2009 1 was the following: 49 actors from all 79 
appear as members of the eight committees dea- 
ling with economically important issues (see Ta-
ble 2). Those five committees that are directly 
involved in national economic issues include from 
6 to 10 representatives of the sample each, and 
those committees that are mostly focused on eco-
nomic issues within a specific sphere have 3–10 
persons from the group of ‘businessmen-politi-
cians’ each. What is more important, those actors 
appear not only as ordinary members of the com-
mittees but as deputy chairmen, even 1st deputy 
chairmen in some cases, and chairmen of subcom-
mittees that focus on particular issues within one 
committee. 
Results displayed in the Table 2 can be treated as 
evidence of the primarily economic interests of par-
liamentarians who were affiliated with business be-
fore coming to politics, and supports the claim that 
such political elite members sought election as a 
means of gaining more influence on the economic 
affairs of the state. This could show a duality of 
causal interdependence: either these former busi-
nessmen become members/deputy chairmen/chair-
men of parliamentary committees due to their expe-
rience in the economic sphere, or the actively seek 
to gain resource advantages for businesses that they 
continue to be affiliated with through control over 
legislative initiatives. 
Conclusion
The presented typology is not a final variant 
since other SNA procedures can and will be applied 
to the sample in the future. Transformation of ‘bio-
graphical’ network (past) ties by current connections 
may result in significant changes in particular ac-
tors’ degree centrality scores – this is a question to 
be answered through analysis of dynamic network 
data, continuous monitoring of elite members inter-
actions, etc.. The main conclusion of the analysis 
presented here is that not all MPs who appeared 
connected through common economic activity in 
the past actually form ‘business groups’ in Parlia-
ment. The data showed that for a number of political 
elite members, common business activity does not 
seem to be the sole determinant of their network 
ties: in addition to maintaining their business links, 
these deputies expand connections with colleagues 
in the political sphere through membership in the 
same committees or common involvement in re-
1 The analysis included period before the term Presidential 
elections in Ukraine and contains only “snapshot” only for the 
mentioned period, but it can be extended with adding dynamic 
component and another periods, before and after the Presidential 
elections.
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Table 1. Distribution of the actors from ‘businessmen-politicians’ group in the Parliamentary Committees (number of 
persons in the committee) 
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The Committee on Fuel and Energy Complex, 
Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety
0 1 1 0 0 8 10
The Committee on Economic Policy 0 1 1 0 3 3 8
The Committee on Industrial and Regulatory 
Policy and Entrepreneurship
0 1 1 1 2 2 7
The Committee on Transport and 
Communications
1 1 0 0 0 4 6
The Committee on Finance and Banking 0 0 3 1 2 0 6
The Committee on Budget 0 0 0 0 2 4 6
The Committee on Freedom of Speeach and 
Infromation
0 1 0 0 1 3 5
The Committee on Environmental Policy, 
Use of Natural Resources and Elimination of 
Consequences of Chornobyl Disaster
0 0 1 1 1 1 4
The Committee on Agrarian Policy and Land 
Relations
0 0 1 0 0 2 3
The Committee on Foreign Affairs 1 0 0 0 1 1 3
The Committee on Taxation and Customs Policy 0 0 1 0 2 0 3
The Committee on Juctice 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
The Committee on Fighting Organized Crime 
and Corruption
0 0 0 0 1 1 2
The Committee on Judicial Policy 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
The Committee on Public Health 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
The Committee on National Security and 
Defence
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
The Committee on the Matters of Pensioners, 
Veterans and the Disabled 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1
The Committee on Construction, Urban 
Development, Housing and Communal Services 
and Regional Policy
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
The Committee on Rules of Parliamentary 
Procedure, Ethics and Support to Work of The 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
The Committee on Legislative Support of Law 
Enforcement
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
The Committee on State Building and Local 
Self-Government 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
The Committee on Family Matters, Youth 
Policy, Sports and Tourism
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
The Committee on Social Policy and Labour 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Total number of actors as Chairmen/ Deputy 
Chairmen/ Secretaries/ etc.
2 5 12 4 20 35 78
gional state authorities. In addition, a third subgroup 
of deputies affiliated with business has demonstrat-
ed that civic activities were quite important for them 
as well.
Finally, the conducted analysis the positions in 
Parliamentary committees occupied by “business-
men-politicians” supports the claim that this group 
of political elite members possesses legal opportu-
nities to influence the economic development of 
Ukraine; membership and/or leadership of a par-
liamentary committee allows one to influence 
legislative changes that can secure and/or aid big 
business both on the state level (in a number 
of economic sectors or within a specific sector of 
economy) and in the context of international eco-
nomic collaboration.
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APPENDIX 1
Table. Degree centrality of actors who were affiliated with a common business enterprise in the past
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Maximum 82.000 18.000 39.000 14.000 4.000
1. Abdullin 6.000 1.000 0.000 9.000 0.000
2. Ariev 0.000 1.000 14.000 0.000 0.000
3. Akhmetov 7.000 18.000 5.000 6.000 0.000
4. Babaev 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
5. Baburin 24.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6. Bahraev 10.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7. Bevzenko 0.000 4.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
8. Belousova 8.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 0.000
9. Bilyi 6.000 5.000 0.000 6.000 0.000
10. Bilorus 14.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 0.000
11. Bohdan 0.000 1.000 10.000 0.000 0.000
12. Bohuslaev 2.000 1.000 4.000 0.000 0.000
13. Boiko 2.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
14. BuriakOV 19.000 1.000 0.000 5.000 0.000
15. Vasadze 21.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
16. Vilkul 0.000 7.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
17. Vlasenko 1.000 1.000 1.000 5.000 0.000
18. Voropaiev 7.000 3.000 0.000 2.000 0.000
19. Herasymchuk 2.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
20. Heller 5.000 1.000 4.000 0.000 0.000
21. Hlazunov 1.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
22. Hlushchenko 0.000 5.000 0.000 6.000 0.000
23. Horoshkevych 6.000 2.000 5.000 1.000 0.000
24. Hryvkovskyi 0.000 4.000 7.000 0.000 0.000
25. Hryniv 7.000 1.000 33.000 12.000 0.000
26. Hudyma 19.000 4.000 24.000 3.000 0.000
27. HumeniukIM 1.000 2.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
28. HumeniukOI 8.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
29. Deich 9.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
30. Demianko 18.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
31. Dzharty 13.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
32. Dovhyi 21.000 2.000 0.000 6.000 0.000
33. Zhevaho 16.000 3.000 3.000 2.000 0.000
34. Zviahilskyi 17.000 2.000 4.000 0.000 1.000
35. Zlochevskyi 6.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
36. Zozulia 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
37. Ivaniushchenko 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
38. Kaliuzhnyi 10.000 1.000 5.000 0.000 0.000
39. KliuevАP 20.000 2.000 17.000 7.000 0.000
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40. KliuevSP 7.000 1.000 16.000 3.000 0.000
41. Kozak 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
42. Kolesnikov 10.000 1.000 8.000 2.000 0.000
43. KoliesnikovD 2.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
44. KorzhPP 9.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
45. KravchenkoМV 5.000 1.000 0.000 4.000 0.000
46. Krainii 0.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
47. Labunska 15.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
48. Landyk 8.000 1.000 4.000 2.000 0.000
49. Landik 7.000 1.000 4.000 1.000 0.000
50. Lytvynov 5.000 2.000 0.000 2.000 0.000
51. Lisin 9.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
52. Lukianov 19.000 2.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
53. Malyshev 4.000 3.000 0.000 2.000 0.000
54. Maltsev 11.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
55. MelnykSA 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
56. Moroko 0.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
57. Osyka 31.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
58. PavlenkoVV 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
59. PavlenkoSG 6.000 4.000 6.000 0.000 0.000
60. Poluneiev 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
61. Prasolov 0.000 6.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
62. Pryhodskyi 6.000 4.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
63. Safiullin 2.000 1.000 3.000 2.000 0.000
64. Selivarov 9.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
65. Skudar 20.000 1.000 15.000 2.000 0.000
66. Sobolev 12.000 1.000 15.000 7.000 0.000
67. Stetskiv 8.000 1.000 27.000 4.000 0.000
68. Sukhyi 4.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
69. Titenko 1.000 2.000 0.000 4.000 0.000
70. Tretiakov 38.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
71. Tryndiuk 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
72. Fedun 7.000 1.000 5.000 0.000 0.000
73. Khmelnytskyi 15.000 3.000 7.000 2.000 0.000
74. Chechetov 4.000 5.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
75. Sharov 17.000 3.000 5.000 0.000 0.000
76. Shevchenko 7.000 1.000 0.000 2.000 0.000
77. Shmidt 0.000 4.000 5.000 0.000 0.000
78. Yankovskyi 28.000 1.000 15.000 1.000 0.000
79. Yatsenyuk 1.000 2.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
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Т. C. Костюченко
МЕРЕЖА УКРАЇНСьКОЇ ЕЛІТИ:  
БІЗНЕС-ЗВ’ЯЗКИ VS. ПОЛІТИЧНІ ЗВ’ЯЗКИ 
Стаття пропонує результати дослідження мережі економічних зв’язків, що накладаються на 
інші типи зв’язків, між представниками української політичної еліти. За основу для вирізнення 
зв’язку взято спільні біографічні відомості щодо керування чи володіння одним і тим самим підпри-
ємством у певний період.
Ключові слова: політичні еліти України, бізнес-мережі, центральні актори, владні вузли.
